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ABSTRACT: The paper introduces and discusses two different types of criticisms of epis-
temic externalism. First, there are criticisms of externalism which I call sceptical criti-
cisms. So-called sceptical critics state that the externalist conception of justification 
leads to the consequence that no belief is justified and hence no belief constitutes 
knowledge. I defend the claim that sceptical criticisms of epistemic externalism are 
generally wrong, because the conclusion which they infer from available premises is 
too strong. However, I suggest that epistemic externalism can be effectively criticized 
to be implausible, but for different reasons. I introduce a second type of criticisms 
which I call practical criticisms of epistemic externalism. So-called practical critics 
argue that from the externalist point of view it is impossible to identify the epistemic 
status of beliefs. This means, in turn, that even if the externalist conception of justifi-
cation was true, it would be practically useless, and therefore implausible.
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1. Introduction
Epistemic externalism is a thesis which does not concern the content of one’s 
beliefs, but it typically relates to conditions under which a belief is justified 
or constitutes knowledge. According to epistemic internalism, the alternative 
approach traditionally contrasted with externalism, justification of beliefs is 
dependent solely on internal factors, i.e. factors internal to the believer’s cog-
1 This paper is part of a project granted by VEGA grant no. 1/0461/15: Cognitive Intui-
tion as a Philosophical Problem. Historical and Contemporary Epistemological Perspectives.
Tento príspevok vychádza ako súčasť riešenia grantovej úlohy VEGA Kognitívna intuícia 
ako filozofický problém. Historické a súčasné epistemologické perspektívy, č. 1/0461/15. 
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nitive perspective or factors to which the believer has special cognitive access. 
For example, if I carefully watch the colour of my table in bright daylight, 
I may have a (internally) justified belief that the table before me is black. In 
contrast with internalism, epistemic externalism claims that justification of 
beliefs is primarily a matter of the belief ’s origin, focusing on its causal his-
tory or the reliability of its source. In general, such factors are neither inter-
nal, nor accessible to the subject’s point of view. Returning to my example, 
my belief that the table before me is black may be (externally) justified if my 
visual perception from which the belief stems is functioning properly and 
therefore is reliable. The paradigmatic case of an externalist theory of justifi-
cation which I will prefer also in this paper is reliabilism devised by A. Gold-
man (see Goldman 1979). Roughly, according to this theory, the justificatory 
status of a belief depends on the reliability of the cognitive process through 
which the belief was formed. The reliability of a cognitive process is defined 
as a tendency of the process to produce rather true beliefs than false ones. It is 
clear that visual perception in bright daylight, for instance, is a more reliable 
source of beliefs than vision in the dark or in the fog.
The externalist approach to justification emerged as an answer to prob-
lems which the traditional internalist understanding of justification was not 
able to deal satisfactorily with. According to classical internalism, knowledge 
is equivalent to justified true belief, where justification is understood as sub-
ject’s possession of adequate reasons in favour of the belief. The roots of this 
view reach to Plato; more recent influential formulations can be found in 
Ayer (1956: 34) and Chisholm (1957: 16). The classical internalist concep-
tion of justification was significantly called into question by well-known 
counterexamples formulated by E. Gettier in his famous paper (1963). These 
counterexamples describe particular situations in which the subject derives 
her belief from false reasons, though from her perspective the reasons look 
perfectly ordinarily. However, despite such a mistake, the subject’s belief hap-
pens to be true thanks to epistemic luck. Thus, according to Gettier, the sub-
ject has a belief which is true as well as (internally) justified, but because of 
the mentioned mistake in deriving her resultant belief she has not knowledge. 
This problem is usually referred to as Gettier problem; it motivated an im-
mense number of attempts to refine or replace the classical tripartite analysis 
of knowledge.
The externalists diagnose the Gettier problem as occurring because of 
a weak, or even non-existent, bound between justification of a belief and 
its truth.2 They assume that if they redefine the concept of justification so 
that it will be in a closer relation to the truth of beliefs, they will be able to 
2 Internalism explicitly admits that a subject may have a well justified belief which is at 
the same time false. 
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eliminate the Gettier problem.3 The before mentioned prominent externalist 
theory of justification, reliabilism, represents the most significant attempt to 
redefine justification in these lines. A. Goldman, “the father of externalism” 
as well as its most famous proponent, develops a process version of reliabilism 
in (Goldman 1979). He defines justification in terms of the belief ’s origin in 
a reliable cognitive process. A cognitive process is understood as any process 
which leads to the occurrence of a belief. But which processes can be consid-
ered to be reliable? The reliability of a process cannot be defined as success-
ful achieving of justification, because a circular definition would emerge: A 
belief is justified if and only if it is a product of a process which is successful 
in achieving justification. Next, the reliability of a process cannot be defined 
neither in terms of successful achieving of knowledge, because given the tri-
partite analysis of knowledge a circular definition would emerge once again: 
A belief is justified if and only if it is a product of a process which is successful 
in achieving justified true beliefs. According to Goldman, reliable cognitive 
processes are those which produce prevalent majority of true beliefs, i.e. proc-
esses which possess a tendency to produce beliefs that are mostly true (see 
Goldman 1979/2008: 338). Regarding the question which specific cognitive 
processes are reliable, Goldman only provides a list of some instructive exam-
ples based on common epistemic intuitions: standard perceptual processes, 
remembering, good reasoning, and introspection (see ibid.). He points out: 
“What these processes seem to have in common is reliability: the beliefs they 
produce are generally true” (ibid.).4 After such considerations, Goldman is 
ready to introduce the central thesis of reliabilism: “The justificational status 
of a belief is a function of the reliability of the process or processes that cause 
it, where … reliability consists in the tendency of a process to produce beliefs 
that are true rather than false” (ibid.). Thus, the decisive factor required for 
justification of beliefs consists in successful registering of truth by means of 
properly functioning cognitive apparatus of the subject. This proposal clearly 
meets the externalist intention to establish a closer tie between justification 
of a belief and its truth.
In general, the reliabilist evaluation of beliefs is quite simple: If a belief 
is produced by a reliable cognitive process, then the belief is justified, and 
may constitute knowledge, but if the belief-producing process is unreliable, 
then the belief is unjustified, and cannot constitute knowledge. In the Get-
tier cases the cognitive process actually used by the subject may be termed 
“inferring from a false premise.” Obviously, such a process could hardly be 
3 This move can be also supported by the obvious contention that “epistemic justifica-
tion implies that one’s belief is objectively likely to be true“ (Poston 2008). 
4 However, an exact specification of the proportion of true beliefs needed to count a 
given process as reliable remains discussed. 
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considered reliable. It is highly probable that repeated usage of the process 
in question, i.e. repeated inferences from false premises, would reveal its in-
ability to produce mostly true beliefs.5 So reliabilists, unlike the traditional 
internalist view, resolve the Gettier problem with the suggestion that the re-
sultant belief of the subject in Gettier cases is in fact unjustified, because 
it is produced by an unreliable cognitive process. In this manner they also 
explain why the belief is not recognized as a case of knowledge. The ability 
of externalism to cope with the Gettier problem as well as its comprehensible 
explanation what mistake it is caused by is considered to be a strong reason 
in favour of this conception of epistemic justification.
2. A problem for epistemic externalism
Despite some initial enthusiasm, the externalist approach has run into its 
own problems. The price paid for closer connection between the justifica-
tion of a belief and its truth consists in the unusual feature that, according 
to externalism, the subject is not required to possess any beliefs concerning 
the justification of her own beliefs. This feature became a popular target of 
criticisms of externalism.
Clearly, if justification is dependent on such factors as proper function-
ing cognitive equipment of the subject or truth-indicating origin of the belief 
in question, then there is no doubt that such factors are typically external to 
the subject’s point of view. To put it differently, subjects typically have little 
or none information regarding the factors from which depends the externalist 
justification of beliefs. Just think how many ordinary believers can tell pre-
cisely how reliably works their cognitive equipment or what is the exact causal 
origin of some belief they possess. Therefore, externalism admits that a subject 
may have a justified belief even if she has none further beliefs regarding the jus-
tification of the belief. The externalists build on different epistemic intuitions 
than traditional internalists – instead of the conception of subjective support 
of a belief they favour an objectively positive status of the belief, although 
hidden from the subject’s perspective. Some authors explicitly state that the 
externalist understanding of justification represents a radical departure from 
ordinary western epistemology (see e. g. BonJour 1980/2008: 365).6
Precisely these characteristics of externalism provoked the emergence of 
the most profound controversies connected with this approach to justifica-
5 The resultant belief produced by this process in the Gettier situation is true only due 
to epistemic luck. 
6 Strictly speaking, externalism does not prohibit the subject from forming beliefs about 
the justification of her beliefs, if they stem from a reliable cognitive process. The externalists 
only negate the internalist requirement that the possession of such beliefs constitutes a neces-
sary condition of justification. 
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tion. There are criticisms of externalism claiming that if a subject has none 
information concerning the justification of her own belief, then her belief is 
in fact unjustified. I will refer to the criticisms of externalism developed in 
these lines as sceptical criticisms of externalism.7 The sceptical criticisms lead 
to a further consequence that given the tripartite analysis of knowledge, the 
subject’s beliefs are not instances of knowledge, because they do not meet 
one necessary condition, the justification, even if they meet the externalist 
conditions. In this section I will take a closer look at the arguments utilized 
by sceptical critics of externalism, while in the next section I will challenge 
their central claim.
The sceptical critics of externalism illustrate their point with a number 
of well-known examples. Among the most famous ones belongs the case of 
Norman the Clairvoyant thought up by L. BonJour (see BonJour 1980/2008: 
369 ff.):
Norman, under certain conditions that usually obtain, is a completely reliable 
clairvoyant with respect to certain kinds of subject matter. He possesses no 
evidence or reasons of any kind for or against the general possibility of such a 
cognitive power, or for or against the thesis that he possesses it. One day Nor-
man comes to believe that the President is in New York City, though he has no 
evidence either for or against this belief. In fact the belief is true and results from 
his clairvoyant power, under circumstances in which it is completely reliable. 
(BonJour 1980/2008: 369)
Since Norman comes to believe that the President is in New York City in a 
factually reliable way, an externalist should conclude that his belief is justi-
fied, and may constitute knowledge. However, one can object: To say that it 
is Norman who justifiably believes it sounds counterintuitive, because Nor-
man himself is in no way consciously involved in the justification of his be-
lief. Hence BonJour asks: “Are there not still sufficient grounds for a charge 
of subjective irrationality to prevent Norman’s being epistemically justified?” 
(ibid.).
A similar story in the same vein can be found in a work of K. Lehrer 
(1990: 163 ff.):
Suppose a person, whom we shall name Mr. Truetemp, undergoes brain sur-
gery by an experimental surgeon who invents a small device which is both a 
very accurate thermometer and a computational device capable of generating 
thoughts. The device, call it a tempucomp, is implanted in Truetemp’s head so 
that the very tip of the device, no larger than the head of pin, sits unnoticed 
7 The term “sceptical criticism” was chosen because its proponents deny externalist justi-
fication and knowledge. I do not mean to indicate thereby any relationship with the classical 
problem of philosophical scepticism. 
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on his scalp and acts as a sensor to transmit information about the temperature 
to the computational system in his brain. This device, in turn, sends a message 
to his brain causing him to think of the temperature recorded by the external 
sensor. Assume that the tempucomp is very reliable, and so his thoughts are 
correct temperature thoughts. All told, this is a reliable belief-forming process. 
Now imagine, finally, that he has no idea that the tempucomp has been inserted 
in his brain, is only slightly puzzled about why he thinks so obsessively about 
the temperature, but never checks a thermometer to determine whether these 
thoughts about the temperature are correct. He accepts them unreflectively, 
another effect of the tempucomp. Thus, he thinks and accepts that the tem-
perature is 104 degrees. It is. Does he know that it is? Surely not. (Lehrer 1990: 
163–164)
Lehrer’s case illustrates the same point as BonJour’s: According to reliabilism, 
Truetemp’s belief should be justified, since it is produced by a factually reli-
able process. But it may be problematic to admit that it is Truetemp him-
self who is justified in believing and, hence, that his belief is an instance of 
knowledge.
The above examples are to be construed as attempts to show that the 
reliability of a cognitive process is neither necessary, nor sufficient condition 
of justification, unless the subject herself is somehow involved in this mat-
ter. We encounter a clash of intuitions. The understanding of justification 
proposed by externalists does not meet the traditional internalist standards. 
The critics of externalism suggest that the theoretical benefits of external-
ism when dealing with traditional epistemological problems (especially the 
Gettier problem) may be irrelevant, if, at the same time, it leads to some 
counterintuitive results.
B. Stroud (1989/2000) addresses a different objection against external-
ism. Recall that externalists do not require the subject to possess any beliefs 
concerning the justification of her beliefs. Reliabilists, for instance, focus only 
on the factual reliability of the cognitive process which produces the belief in 
question. According to Stroud, this approach leads to the consequence that re-
liabilism does not allow us to understand how our own knowledge is possible:
The difficulty arises now from the fact that we as human theorists are ourselves 
part of the subject-matter that we theorists of human knowledge want to under-
stand in a certain way. If we merely study another group and draw conclusions 
only about them, no such difficulty presents itself. But then our conclusions will 
not be completely general. They will be known to apply only to those others, 
and we will be no closer to understanding how our own knowledge is possible. 
We want to be able to apply what we find out about knowledge to ourselves, 
and so to explain how our own knowledge is possible. (Stroud 2000: 112)
The core of Stroud’s argument consists in the claim that the reliabilist thesis, 
according to which additional beliefs about the justification of beliefs are not 
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required, relates also to reliabilists themselves. Thus, they are not required to 
possess any beliefs about the justification of their own beliefs which results 
into the consequence that reliabilists themselves do not understand how their 
own knowledge is possible. In other words, once a subject adopts reliabilism, 
she adopts the mentioned reliabilist thesis as well, by which ipso facto she 
excludes herself from the set of subjects whose justification and knowledge 
she can explain.
This leads to a further, even more uncomfortable consequence: Among 
the reliabilist’s beliefs there is also the belief that reliabilism is true. If one 
adopts reliabilism, then a bizarre result occurs that one need not dispose of 
any information about how reliabilism itself is justified. Hence, a reliabilist, 
in accordance with her own position, does not have to possess any reasons 
in favour of reliabilism’s truth; she does not have to be able to answer the 
question, why is her favourite theory better than other competing theories? 
From the theoretical point of view that is a very unsatisfactory result: to hold 
a theory without submitting any reasons in its favour sounds quite irration-
ally. What is more, not only reliabilists, i.e. theorists in epistemology, have to 
concern with this problem. Presupposing reliabilism, this problem relates to 
any subject willing to find out the epistemic status of their own beliefs.
Nevertheless, we should not be too hasty. On the one hand, the external-
ist approach to justification does not require the subject to have any beliefs 
about the epistemic status of her own beliefs. On the other hand, however, 
externalism does not forbid forming such beliefs. If the cognitive process 
which is the source of such a belief is in fact reliable, then the subject can ac-
quire a justified belief, and potential knowledge, about the epistemic status of 
some other belief of hers. If this condition is met, then, contrary to Stroud’s 
opinion, it seems that any subject may understand their own knowledge after 
all. Is it a plausible way of refusing Stroud’s objection? Let us have a closer 
look at the possible formation of such metabeliefs. If reliabilism is true, and 
if the given cognitive process is reliable, then by means of this process the 
subject can reliably evaluate correlations between relevant facts and her cor-
responding beliefs. So she can assess the reliability of her cognitive processes 
and, in turn, also the justification, or the epistemic status, of her beliefs. For 
example, by means of visual perception she can observe facts regarding the 
external world and compare them with her perceptual beliefs. Similarly, by 
means of memory she can “observe” facts regarding the past and compare 
them with her memory beliefs etc.
But such procedures suffer from an evident problem: they involve epis-
temic circularity. N. Lemos comments on this issue as follows: “Can one use 
memory to support the reliability of memory? Can one use sense percep-
tion to support the reliability of sense perception? Many philosophers would 
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say “no.” Many would hold that one cannot use beliefs from a source, A, to 
support the reliability of A. They would tell us that such a procedure is epis-
temically unsatisfactory” (Lemos 2007: 117). There are also more resolute 
reactions to epistemic circularity. One can be found in R. Fumerton’s work: 
“You cannot use perception to justify the reliability of perception! You cannot 
use memory to justify the reliability of memory! You cannot use induction to 
justify the reliability of induction! Such attempts to respond to the skeptic’s 
concerns involve blatant, indeed pathetic, circularity” (Fumerton 1995: 177). 
Obviously, epistemic circularity is considered to be something undesirable. It 
consists in an implicit assumption of the reliability of a source of beliefs when 
proving the reliability of the very same source. The undesirability of epistemic 
circularity is often being made apparent with the use of various analogies. 
Fumerton compares it to proving the reliability of astrology by reading it in 
the stars (see ibid.). M. Huemer invented a more sophisticated example:
I have on my desk an epistemologically interesting toy called “the Magic Eight 
Ball.” It is a plastic ball painted like an eight ball, and it is meant to be used 
as follows. You ask the eight ball a yes/no question. Then you turn it over and 
see an answer float up to a window in the bottom. Answers include the likes 
of “Yes, definitely,” “Very doubtful,” and “Cannot predict now.” Now, imagine 
there were a community in which use of the eight ball was an accepted method 
of arriving at conclusions. Suppose you meet one of these eight-ball reasoners, 
and you ask him why he believes that the eight ball is a reliable informant. He 
swiftly takes out his Magic Eight Ball, says, “Are you reliable?” and turns it over. 
At this point, if the answer “No” floats up to the window, then the eight-ball 
reasoner is in trouble. But suppose a definite “Yes” answer appears, and the 
eight-ball reasoner triumphantly declares that the reliability of the eight ball has 
been established. Would this be legitimate? Evidently not. (Huemer 2001: 11)
Thus, unless it is already known that the cognitive process in question is reli-
able, it cannot be used to prove anything, let alone its own reliability. If the 
process is unreliable, then its unreliability may cause that it produces a false 
belief concerning its own reliability. To put it more simple, just due to its own 
unreliability, such process may falsely tell that it is reliable.
It seems that because of the threat of epistemic circularity it is not possi-
ble to identify from the subject’s viewpoint which cognitive processes of hers 
are in fact reliable and, in turn, which beliefs of hers are justified and may 
constitute knowledge.8 This finding leads to an interesting and significant re-
8 Externalists usually respond to the charge of epistemic circularity so that we have no 
other choice than using those belief-forming processes which we naturally possess. They be-
lieve that epistemic circularity need not always be vicious (e.g. see Greco 2000: 184–187). 
Nonetheless, this view is not yet sufficient for claiming that whichever of our cognitive proc-
esses escapes the circularity problem. 
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sult: As it turned out, reliabilism, and externalism in general, neither requires 
the subject to possess beliefs concerning the justification of her beliefs, but, 
what is more, nor allows possessing such beliefs, should their possession be 
reasonable. Hence, the externalist approach to justification does not allow 
the subject to have any epistemically legitimate access to the conditions of 
justification of her own beliefs. Returning to Stroud, the consequence that 
the subject does not understand her own knowledge holds, indeed. This is a 
fundamental problem of externalist theories that cannot be averted by some 
simple theoretical modification. It follows from the very essence of external-
ism, i.e. from shifting the attention to factors outside of the subject’s cogni-
tive perspective.
3. Sceptical criticisms of externalism
Objections against epistemic externalism described in the previous section are 
quite well-known within epistemology. My main concern in this paper is to 
take a closer look at further interpretations of the problems as well as the con-
sequences which philosophers derive from them. There is one line of thought 
claiming that the impossibility to identify the conditions of justification of 
a belief is equivalent to saying that the belief in question is unjustified, and 
hence, does not constitute knowledge. For instance, McGrew and McGrew 
(2007) defend the following thesis: “If it is in principle impossible to show 
decisively that S’s belief that p is justified, then S is not justified in believing 
that p” (McGrew and McGrew 2007: 73). These authors conclude that even 
if a belief satisfies all conditions required by externalism, it is epistemically 
unjustified, unless the subject can recognize that those conditions are satis-
fied. They state that, in the end, the externalist position entails “epistemic 
anarchy”: “it entails that there is, in principle, no way of decisively distin-
guishing genuine epistemic principles from absurd ones and hence no way of 
decisively distinguishing beliefs that have positive epistemic status from those 
that do not” (ibid.: 82). There are also opinions claiming that the externalist 
non-identifiability of justification leads to violation of the rational nature 
of knowledge. Cruz and Pollock (1999) insist that in order to distinguish 
between “right” and “wrong” knowing one has to possess epistemic norms 
placed within one’s cognitive perspective. In other words, the subject needs 
to possess internal criteria of “right” knowing in order to know rationally. 
On the contrary, to admit that epistemic norms do not have to be internal 
equals to giving up the distinction between knowledge and non-knowledge. 
According to these authors, the externalist understanding leads to the con-
sequence that knowledge is deprived of its rational character, and thus of its 
epistemic value (see Cruz and Pollock 1999: 132–133).
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Such criticisms of epistemic externalism can be considered as typical 
cases of what I call sceptical criticisms of externalism.9 However, I will try to 
show that this line of criticising externalism is generally wrong, because it is 
too hasty. The impossibility to identify the justificatory status of beliefs from 
the subject’s viewpoint does not necessarily mean that the beliefs fail to meet 
the conditions required by reliabilism, or other externalist theory, and that 
they fail to be justified in this sense. Notice that there are two different things 
logically independent from each other:
(1) the justification of a belief, i.e. the factual fulfilling of the conditions of 
justification;
(2) the identification of the justification of a belief from the subject’s viewpoint.
An externalist would say that even if we cannot identify any of our justified 
beliefs, it is still not a sufficient reason to conclude that none of our beliefs 
are justified. We may possess plenty of beliefs which are factually justified in 
the way externalism requires, although it does not necessarily mean that the 
subject should have any access to such justification. Indeed, the reliabilists, 
and externalists in general, pay careful attention to the difference between the 
description of justification and the identification of justification; with empha-
sis placed on correct description of justification and knowledge. The earlier 
mentioned “father of externalism”, A. Goldman, makes an important note in 
this regard: “Truth conditions should not be confused with verification con-
ditions. My analysis of “S knows p” does not purport to give procedures for 
finding out whether a person (including oneself ) knows a given proposition” 
(Goldman 1967: 372).10
I argue that those who I call the sceptical critics of externalism are insuf-
ficiently sensitive to the indicated difference. From the difficulties connected 
with identifying the externalist justification they infer that the externalist de-
scription of justification is itself mistaken which leads them to the conclusion 
that in the externalist framework, beliefs are unjustified. However, such infer-
ence is wrong; as I pointed out, the question of identifying justified beliefs 
is logically independent from the question whether the externalist descrip-
 9 Another example of this kind is presented by R. Fumerton. His “resolute reaction” 
to epistemic circularity cited in the previous section continues: “Frankly, this does seem right 
to me and I hope it seems right to you, but if it does, then I suggest that you have a powerful 
reason to conclude that externalism is false” (Fumerton 1995: 177). 
10 In a different paper (Goldman 1980), A. Goldman distinguishes between “regulative” 
and “theoretical” conceptions of justification. Whereas the former ones provide the subject 
with instructions how to improve her set of beliefs, the latter ones only concentrate on an ac-
curate description of justification-production. In this light, internalists generally aim at regula-
tive conceptions, while externalists are interested in theoretical conceptions. The point is that 
failing to discriminate between those two types of conceptions may lead to misguided or unfair 
objections against each of them. 
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tion of justification holds. Therefore I conclude that the sceptical criticisms of 
externalism are misguided, because the conclusion they infer from available 
premises is too strong, which makes them implausible.
A possible explanation of the sceptical critics’ conception may consist 
in the supposition that their view is too reliant on the traditional internalist 
optics. According to internalism, only such information count as justification 
which is, or can be, stated by the subject herself. If the subject does not, or 
cannot, possess some information, then it is not a part of justification. But 
the externalists understand justification in a different way, focusing on objec-
tive features of beliefs. Once these features occur, the belief gains a positive 
epistemic status – even without requiring the subject to understand these 
features, and hence, to understand the epistemic status of the beliefs at all. It 
is surely a great change in accounting justification, when compared to classic 
internalism. Yet, the inability of the subject to understand the justification 
of her own beliefs does not constitute a sufficient reason for a total refusing 
of externalism. Contrary to the view of the sceptical critics, the subject may 
still have many beliefs which are factually justified in the way externalists 
suggest.
4. Practical criticisms of externalism
Now I return to the statement that externalism does not require the subject 
to possess any beliefs regarding the epistemic status of her own beliefs, but, 
on the other hand, it does not explicitly prohibit her from forming such 
beliefs. In the second section of this paper I demonstrated, in conflict with 
the externalists’ intentions, that there is no epistemic relevant way how the 
subject could obtain such metabeliefs. This leads to the uncomfortable result 
that provided externalism, the subject disposes of no reasonable way how to 
relevantly identify the epistemic status of her own beliefs. I want to stress 
again, as I indicated in the previous section, that the impossibility to identify 
justification does not equal to failing in acquiring justified beliefs. In the 
terms of reliabilism, many beliefs may possess the property “to be the product 
of a reliable cognitive process,” irrespective of the subject’s knowing which 
beliefs do in fact possess that property.
Thus, I do not argue with externalism at the level of describing justifi-
cation; I want to draw attention to problems occurring at the level of iden-
tifying justification. At this latter level it seems that externalism de facto leaves 
the subject in a state of complete epistemic ignorance. In this section I will 
present some of the implications of this remarkable result. At the same time, 
I will also show relevant ways of criticizing externalism which I call practical 
criticisms, and which, in contrast to sceptical criticisms, I consider plausible.
42 Prolegomena 14 (1) 2015
First of all, a subject adopting reliabilism is restricted to conditional for-
mulations of the form “if – then.” She is not able to provide a definite answer 
to the question whether a given belief of hers is justified. She can only say 
that if reliabilism is true, and if the given belief is reliably formed, then the 
belief is justified and may constitute knowledge. But if the given belief is not 
a product of a reliable cognitive process, then it is not justified, and hence it 
is not knowledge. Although such conditionals express exact conditional rela-
tions between the justification of beliefs and the reliability of their sources, 
they are completely useless in evaluating the real epistemic status of some 
given belief.
This result constitutes a more serious theoretical problem for the ex-
ternalists themselves. They face the absurd outcome that once they adopt 
externalism, they will not dispose of any relevant information supporting 
the belief that externalism is true. To put it differently, once they adopt this 
position, they will have at hand no adequate reasons in favour of the position 
they defend. A similar objection is addressed by B. Stroud (2000) suggesting 
that the externalist theoretician is situated in a precarious situation allowing 
him to make only conditional statements:
I don’t know whether I understand human knowledge or not. If what I believe 
about it is true and my beliefs about it are produced in what my theory says is 
the right way, I do know how human knowledge comes to be, so in that sense I 
do understand. But if my beliefs are not true, or not arrived at in that way, I do 
not. I wonder which it is. I wonder whether I understand human knowledge or 
not. (Stroud 2000: 119)
According to Stroud, the externalist can only insist that externalism is true, 
even without providing reasons in its favour, and require the others to accept 
it. However, such attitude is highly unsatisfactory from the philosophical 
point of view.11
The practical criticisms of externalism generally consist in accusing this 
approach of its inability to satisfy the philosophical curiosity. Undoubtedly, 
the major interest of epistemological investigations rests in the determination 
whether our beliefs correspond to reality; or, in solving the question whether 
we really know the things we think we know about the world. But, to an-
swer conditionally that if our beliefs satisfy certain external criteria, then they 
are justified, and if they do not, then they are unjustified, still without any 
practical instruction how to differentiate between these two options from the 
subject’s point of view, seems definitely insufficient, with respect to the objec-
11 Summary of the most serious deficiencies of externalism in these or closely related 
lines are offered by several authors; for instance see Fumerton (1995), Stroud (2000), and 
Bergmann (2006). 
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tives of epistemology. Externalists focus primarily on the objective features of 
justification and attempt to create its original description. Nonetheless, even 
if their description is true, their approach to justification cannot be success-
ful, unless they allow the subjects to make functional evaluations of their own 
beliefs from the first-person viewpoint. The question arises, what for does the 
subject have “factually justified beliefs”, if she does not have the opportunity 
to realize their epistemic status? Without understanding how we know, how 
could ever develop science, philosophy, and any theoretical project at all? 
This result is also incompatible with common epistemic intuitions accord-
ing to which the subject should certainly dispose of a way of distinguishing 
between knowledge and non-knowledge.
What I call the practical criticisms is based on the thesis which we came 
to in this paper: provided externalism, no subject has and cannot have any 
reasonable information about the justification of her own beliefs. The first part 
of the thesis, stating that any subject has not metabeliefs on justification, is 
consistent with the externalist claims which, as we already know, do not con-
tain such requirement. But the second part, stating moreover that any subject 
cannot have metabeliefs on justification, exceeds the intentions of externalism 
and calls into question its plausibility. In contrast to the sceptical critics who 
draw from it a hasty conclusion suggesting that externalism is false, a practi-
cal critic should only point out that this consequence of externalism causes its 
inapplicability for human objectives in the field of epistemology. At first sight 
it is not as much as a direct refutation of externalism, but, however, finding 
out that externalism describes justification in a way which makes it irrelevant 
for human interests, is in my opinion not less serious and represents a radical 
undermining of this approach.
5. Conclusion
The reader can surely see that I am not inclined towards the externalist assess-
ment of belief-justification. On the one hand, I find this theoretical branch 
quite inspiring and I do not doubt its importance for the epistemology of the 
second half of the 20th century. But on the other hand, the difficulties con-
nected with the practical applicability of externalist theories look so far insur-
mountable, which, I think, is a too serious deficiency preventing one from 
accepting externalism. However, refusing a theory or an approach has to be 
based on the right kinds of reasons. That might well be the main point of my 
paper. I tried to demonstrate that the impossibility to identify the epistemic 
status of a belief from the subject’s viewpoint does not pose a problem for the 
externalist description of justification. Thus I have shown that one popular 
way of criticizing externalism, claiming that it leads to sceptical outcomes, is 
in fact misguided. In my opinion, the only correct possibility left for a critic 
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of externalism, though not less powerful, consists in pointing to its practical 
uselessness in achieving human objectives.
Last but not least, what are the prospects of this situation? One possible 
way of dealing with the controversy between internalism and externalism 
may lie in focusing on the concept of justification itself, as specified in the 
works of internalists and externalists, respectively. There already are sugges-
tions that these two lines of thought do not use the same concept of justifi-
cation, but refer to different things when speaking about it (see e.g. recent 
papers Nuhlíček 2013a and 2013b). If such suggestions are right, then there 
a new space is opened for reflecting the relationship between the internalist 
concept of justification and the externalist one. What I see as the next step is 
an attempt to reconcile those two concepts, or, to put it differently, to find 
a broader epistemological framework in which the internalist as well as the 
externalist qualities of beliefs will find their proper role.12
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